Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment and Wage-Unemployment Dynamics

Jonathan Thomas and Andy Snell

No 179, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: This paper analyses a model in which firms cannot pay discriminate based on year of entry to a firm, and develops an equilibrium model of wage dynamics and unemployment. The model is developed under the assumption of worker mobility, so that workers can costlessly quit jobs at any time. Firms on the other hand are committed to contracts. Thus the model is related to Beaudry and DiNardo (1991). We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment, and show that real wages do not necessarily clear the labor market. Using sectoral productivity data from the post-war US economy, we assess the ability of the model to match unemployment series. We also show that equal treatment follows in our model from the assumption of at-will employment contracting.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment, and Wage-Unemployment Dynamics (2010)
Working Paper: Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment and Wage-Unemployment Dynamics (2006)
Working Paper: Labour Contracts, Equal Treatment and Wage-Unemployment Dynamics (2006)
Working Paper: Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment and Wage-Unemployment Dynamics (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed009:179

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().