Community Enforcement Beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma

Julio González-Díaz and Joyee Deb (joyee.deb@nyu.edu)

No 398, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: repeated anonymous random matching setting. It is well known that, if the stage-game is the prisoner's dilemma, cooperation can be supported in equilibrium through grim trigger, also called 'community enforcement' or contagion in this setting. But, little is known about sustaining cooperation in games other than the prisoner's dilemma, when information transmission is minimal. In this paper we consider a class of two-player games beyond the prisoner's dilemma, and characterize a subset of the individually rational and feasible payoffs that can be sustained in sequential equilibrium, if players are sufficiently patient. Cooperation is sustained through what we call 'delayed contagion'. In the equilibria we construct, there is an initial phase of trust-building in which deviations are temporarily ignored. Once trust has been built, the communities play cooperatively.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed009:398

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann (chuichuiche@gmail.com).