Optimal monetary policy in a model with agency costs

Timothy Fuerst, Matthias Paustian and Charles Carlstorm
Additional contact information
Matthias Paustian: Bank of England
Charles Carlstorm: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

No 667, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: is the optimal policy. We derive the targeting criterion that implements optimal monetary policy under commitment and show under what conditions the target depends on leads or lags of the risk premium. Finally, the paper demonstrates that the degree of price stickiness and/or the nature of monetary policy alter the endogenous propagation of net worth across time.

Date: 2009
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Journal Article: Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model with Agency Costs (2010)
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