Heterogeneous Beliefs and Optimal Taxation
Anderson Schneider and
Facundo Piguillem ()
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Anderson Schneider: University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
No 826, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
signal about the fundamental. The rst characteristic implies that the best policy (tax on investment) with commitment is state contingent. The second and third characteristics make the information incomplete. In particular, agents have di erent information sets, and therefore di erent beliefs, about the true state of the economy. As a result, independently of the accuracy of the signal, incomplete information reduces the set of equilibrium payo s. First, we show that any policy that depends solely on the fundamental cannot be an equilibrium. Second, the best equilibrium policy is independent of the fundamental. Finally, for any discount factor strictly smaller than one and for any size of the noise, the best equilibrium is inecient.
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