Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns

Guillermo Ordonez and Andrew Atkeson

No 830, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: and strong reputation concerns.

Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2009/paper_830.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns (2015)
Working Paper: Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns (2014)
Working Paper: Optimal regulation in the presence of reputation concerns (2012)
Working Paper: Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed009:830

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().