DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDER PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY
Julien Prat
No 249, 2011 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Abstract:
We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed and when the effort and noise affect output additively. We then analytically solve for the optimal contract when the agent has exponential utility. We find that the Pareto frontier shifts out as information about the agent’s quality improves. In the standard spot-market setup, by contrast, when the parameter measures the agent’s “quality”, the Pareto frontier shifts inwards with better information. Commitment is therefore more valuable when quality is known more precisely. Incentives then are easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the beliefs of the principal. Moreover, in contrast to results under one-period commitment, wage volatility declines as experience accumulates.
Date: 2011
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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty (2010) 
Working Paper: Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty (2010) 
Working Paper: Dynamic Incentive Contracts Under Parameter Uncertainty (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed011:249
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