Sovereign Default and Information Frictions

Roberto Pancrazi, Christian Hellwig and Constance de Soyres
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Constance de Soyres: Toulouse School of Economics

No 1212, 2015 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We argue that information frictions in sovereign bond markets, along with limits to arbitrage, can account for anomalies in sovereign bond spreads, as well as empirically plausible savings and default incentives for borrowing countries.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed015:1212

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