Carlstrom and Fuerst meets Epstein and Zin: The Asset Pricing Implications of Contracting Frictions
Ram Yamarthy,
Amir Yaron and
João Gomes ()
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Ram Yamarthy: University of Pennsylvania
Amir Yaron: University of Pennsylvania
No 1267, 2015 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Abstract:
Models with financial frictions have been shown to create amplification and persistence effects in macroeconomic fluctuations. We test the ability that Costly State Verification (CSV) has to generate empirically plausible risk exposures in asset markets, when Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences are implemented. Under the setup of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) alongside recursive preferences, we find that the CSV friction is negligible in augmenting the aggregate equity premium, explaining roughly thirty basis points when monitoring costs are increased. Additionally we find that the separation between the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and risk aversion plays a key role in explaining financial market dynamics. We are only able to generate sizable equity premium when the elasticity is greater than one.
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed015:1267
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