Worker Mobility in a Search Model with Adverse Selection

Leo Kaas and Carlos Carrillo-Tudela

No 351, 2015 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We analyze the effects of adverse selection on worker turnover and wage dynamics in a frictional labor market. We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer promotion wage contracts to workers of different ability, which is unknown to firms at the hiring stage. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium, whereas high-wage firms offer pooling contracts, promoting high-ability workers only. Low-ability workers have higher turnover rates and are more often employed in low-wage firms. The model replicates the negative relationship between job-to-job transitions and wages observed in the U.S. labor market.

Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-dge
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2015/paper_351.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Worker mobility in a search model with adverse selection (2015)
Working Paper: Worker Mobility in a Search Model with Adverse Selection (2015)
Working Paper: Worker Mobility in a Search Model with Adverse Selection (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed015:351

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2015 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().