Regressive Subsidy to EHI and Entrepreneurial Talent Allocation

Anne Villamil and Zhigang Feng
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Anne Villamil: University of Iowa

No 1059, 2017 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: Abstract Americans who obtain health insurance coverage through employment do not currently pay income or payroll taxes on this benefit. Tax-deductible employer-based health insurance (EHI) is regressive, and we show that this tax policy can help correct misallocation between self-employment and firm employment. Agents face idiosyncratic health risk and have heterogeneous ability as workers or entrepreneurs, and choose their occupation. Linking employment and health insurance creates a wedge between the marginal cost and benefit of EHI and employment at a firm. In equilibrium, some highly skilled individuals with adverse health shocks leave entrepreneurship while individuals with intermediate skills but favorable health shocks opt to manage firms. In the presence of imperfect information on private agent's health risk and managerial ability, and in the absence of perfectly discriminating taxes, a regressive tax subsidy for entrepreneurs to purchase health insurance helps correct distortions associated with non-contractible heterogeneity in managerial talent and health shocks. The subsidy makes entrepreneurship a more (less) attractive option for the highly (medium) skilled unhealthy (healthy) agents as such a policy increases (reduces) net-tax entrepreneurial income. Consequently, this tax policy provides an additional incentive (disincentive) for the first (second) type to be an entrepreneur, hence improving talent allocation. For a dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to the US economy, we find that the welfare gain from improved talent allocation outweighs the loss due to reduced risk sharing associated with the regressive subsidy.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-ias
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