Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions With Bad Outcomes ?

Franck Malherbet and Helene Benghalem
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Helene Benghalem: CREST

No 974, 2017 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the consequences of the taxation of temporary jobs recently introduced in several European countries to induce fi rms to create more open-ended contracts and to increase the duration of jobs. The estimation of a job search and matching model on French data shows that the taxation of temporary jobs does not reach its objectives: it reduces the mean duration of jobs and decreases job creation, employment and welfare of unemployed workers. We find that a reform introducing an open-ended contract without layoff costs for separations occurring at short tenure would have opposite effects.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-eur and nep-pbe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes? (2020)
Working Paper: Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes? (2020)
Working Paper: Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes? (2020)
Working Paper: Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions With Bad Outcomes ? (2016)
Working Paper: Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes? (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed017:974

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