Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions With Bad Outcomes ?
Pierre Cahuc,
Olivier Charlot,
Franck Malherbet,
Benghalem, Hélène and
Emeline Limon
No 11628, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the consequences of the taxation of temporary jobs recently introduced in several European countries to induce firms to create more open-ended contracts and to increase the duration of jobs. The estimation of a job search and matching model on French data shows that the taxation of temporary jobs does not reach its objectives: it reduces the mean duration of jobs and decreases job creation, employment and welfare of unemployed workers. We find that a reform introducing an open-ended contract without layoff costs for separations occurring at short tenure would have opposite effects.
Keywords: Temporary jobs; Employment protection legislation; Taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J63 J64 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes? (2020) 
Working Paper: Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes? (2020)
Working Paper: Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes? (2020)
Working Paper: Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions With Bad Outcomes ? (2017) 
Working Paper: Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes? (2016) 
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