Who Bears the Welfare Costs of Monopoly? The Case of the Credit Card Industry
Gajendran Raveendranathan and
Kyle Herkenhoff
No 67, 2019 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Abstract:
How are the welfare costs from monopoly borne? We answer this question in the context of the U.S. credit card industry, which is highly concentrated, charges interest rates that are 3.4 to 8.8 percentage points above competitive pricing, generates excess profits, and has repeatedly lost antitrust lawsuits. We depart from existing consumer credit models that assume perfect competition (e.g. Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007,2010) and Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull, 2007), by integrating oligopolistic lenders into a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagariframework. Our model accounts for roughly half of the spreads and excess profits observed in the data. The welfare gains to the current population from competitive reforms in the credit card industry are equivalent to a onetime transfer to households worth 3.4 percent of GDP. Along the transition path, all cohorts realize welfare gains from competitive reforms. Asset poor households benefit the most from increased consumption smoothing. Asset rich households also benefit from higher general equilibrium saving interest rates.
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ind and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2019/paper_67.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Who Bears the Welfare Costs of Monopoly? The Case of the Credit Card Industry (2020)
Working Paper: Who Bears the Welfare Costs of Monopoly? The Case of the Credit Card Industry (2019)
Working Paper: Who Bears the Welfare Costs of Monopoly? The Case of the Credit Card Industry (2019)
Working Paper: Who Bears the Welfare Costs of Monopoly? The Case of the Credit Card Industry (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed019:67
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in 2019 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().