Unbundling Truthful Revelation when Auctioning Bundled Goods

Pascal Courty, Daniel Rondeau and Maurice Doyon

No 2015-05, Working Papers from University of Victoria, Department of Economics, Resource Economics and Policy Analysis Research Group

Abstract: We study truthful revelation when a seller auctions bundles of goods and is interested in learning the buyer’s valuations for each individual good. We generalize the auction rules for the Becker- Degroot-Marschak mechanism and the Vickrey auction to induce truthful revelation.

Keywords: Auction; truthful revelation; Becker-Degroot-Marschak mechanism; Vickrey auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 Q23 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Unbundling Truthful Revelation when Auctioning Bundled Goods (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rep:wpaper:2015-05

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