Unbundling Truthful Revelation when Auctioning Bundled Goods

Pascal Courty, Daniel Rondeau and Maurice Doyon ()
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Maurice Doyon: Université Laval

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 4, 2512-2517

Abstract: We study a seller who auctions bundles of goods and is interested in learning the buyer's valuations for each individual good. We show that truthful revelation is never the unique dominant strategy when each bundle contains multiple goods. We study the case with linear bundles and propose auction rules that eliminate all non-truthful reports for the Becker-Degroot-Marschak mechanism and the Vickrey auction.

Keywords: Auction; truthful revelation; Becker-Degroot-Marschak mechanism; Vickrey auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12-13
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http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2015/Volume35/EB-15-V35-I4-P252.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Unbundling Truthful Revelation when Auctioning Bundled Goods (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-15-00685

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