Electoral Intermediaries

Jorge Gallego, Christopher Li and Leonard Wantchekon

Working papers from Red Investigadores de Economía

Abstract: Democratic elections increasingly involve political intermediaries (e.g. grassroots organizations or political brokers). We develop a model of electoral competition in which candidates must decide between brokers (patronage) and grassroots organizations. Our model shows that patronage is more likely when public offices are relatively more “valuable” for brokers. Moreover, setups that constrain candidates from funding grassroots campaigns and weaken ties between politicians and citizens make patronage more likely. We show that patronage negatively affects citizens’ welfare, as winning brokers turned civil servants undermine the quality of governments. Finally, our model explores the role of policy deliberation in curbing patronage politics.

Keywords: Patronage; Intermediaries; Clientelism; Elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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