Managerial Delegation under Alternative Unionization Structures

Luciano Fanti and Nicola Meccheri ()

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: This paper studies a three-stage duopoly game with managerial delegation and (monopoly) unions that can be either decentralized or industry-wide. Main findings point out the opposite role played by the introduction of managerial delegation according to the different nature of unionization structure. Indeed, while under industry-wide union managerial delegation leads to incentives for sales, lower profits and higher consumer surplus as well as overall welfare, in the presence of decentralized (firm-specific) unions all those results are reversed. Moreover, and most importantly, introducing managerial delegation makes unionization structure neutral in relation to consumer’s surplus and overall efficiency.

Keywords: managerial delegation; unionized duopoly; union’s structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Managerial Delegation under Alternative Unionization Structures (2013)
Working Paper: Managerial delegation under alternative unionization structures (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:07_12

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