Collective Bargaining and Innovation

John Addison, Paulino Teixeira, Katalin Evers (katalin.evers@iab.de) and Lutz Bellmann (lutz.bellmann@iab.de)
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Katalin Evers: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Germany
Lutz Bellmann: Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, IZA Bonn, Germany

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: At the level of theory, the effect of collective bargaining on innovation is disputed. The U.S. evidence clearly points to adverse effects, but other-country experience suggests that certain industrial relations systems, or the wider regulatory apparatus, might even tip the balance in favor of unions. Our pooled cross section and difference-in-differences estimates provide weak evidence that German collective bargaining inhibits innovation. However, in conjunction with workplace representation, it might even foster innovative activity.

Date: 2015-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-edu, nep-hrm, nep-soc and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:15-07

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