Fixed point theorems via Nash Equilibria

Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

No 460, Textos para discussão from Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil)

Abstract: In this note we show that the fixed points of a continuous function (or of an upper semi-continuous correspondence, with non-empty and convex values) can be attained as Nash Equilibria of a game with finitely many players.

Pages: 5 pages
Date: 2002-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rio:texdis:460

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