Gender at Work: Productivity and Incentives

Matteo Migheli ()

No 74-2010, AICCON Working Papers from Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit

Abstract: This paper analyses the relationship between workers’ gender and monetary incentives in an experimental setting based on a double-tournament scheme. The participants must choose between a piece-rate payment or a performance prize. The results show that women tend to shy away from competition, and are less sensitive than men to the monetary incentives of the tournament. In addition the tournament scheme induces males, but not women, to signal their ability and to select the contract which is more profitable for them.

Keywords: gender; incentives; work; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J16 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2010-05-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
Note: Reference author: University of Eastern Piedmont, Department of Public Policy and Collective Choice; Via Cavour 84 - 15100 Alessandria (Italy). Email: matteo.migheli@sp.unipmn.it Phone: +39 0131 283 873 Fax: +39 0131 283 704.
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Working Paper: Gender at work: Productivity and incentives (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:aiccon:2010_074

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