Gender at work: Productivity and incentives
Matteo Migheli ()
POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
This paper analyses the relationship between workers' gender and monetary incentives in an experimental setting based on a double-tournament scheme. The participants must choose between a piece-rate payment or a performance prize. The results show that women tend to shy away from competition, and are less sensitive than men to the monetary incentives of the tournament. In addition the tournament scheme induces males, but not women, to signal their ability and to select the contract which is more profitable for them.
Keywords: gender; incentives; work; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J16 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zg1SGjqjylsTdloVd ... OcP/view?usp=sharing (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Gender at Work: Productivity and Incentives (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:142
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucia Padovani ().