Happiness and Preferences in a Legality Social Dilemma

Leonardo Becchetti, Germana Corrado, Vittorio Pelligra and Fiammetta Rossetti

No 145-2016, AICCON Working Papers from Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit

Abstract: We investigate players’ preferences in a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma by comparing results from a direct (satisfaction based) and an indirect (choice based) approach. Both approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who cooperate above median being less affected in their choice by monetary payoffs vis-à-vis the public good component. The combination of a legality frame plus a conformity information design reduces further the relative preference (satisfaction) for the non-cooperative choice for such players. Our findings support the hypothesis that (part of the) players have, in addition to the standard self-interest component, an other-regarding preference argument that is further satisfied in the legality frame plus conformity design.

Keywords: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; Corruption; Laboratoty Experiment; Legality Game; Redistribution; Conformity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 D73 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2016-02-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hap and nep-hpe
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