Patent Protection with a Cooperative R&D Option

XiaoGang Che () and Yibai Yang
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XiaoGang Che: University of Alberta, Department of Economics, Postal: 8-14 HM Tory Building, Edmonton, AB, T6G 2H4

No 2012-6, Working Papers from University of Alberta, Department of Economics

Abstract: Patent protection may decrease R&D incentives due to the tournament e ffect. In this paper, we show that patent protection in the presence of a cooperative R&D option always increases the R&D incentive. In addition, this option dominates imitation to increase the R&D incentive under patent protection, and may also dominate royalty licensing depending on the R&D cost.

Keywords: cooperative R&D; patent protection; R&D incentive (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O34 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2012-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Patent protection with a cooperative R&D option (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:albaec:2012_006

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