Patent protection with a cooperative R&D option
XiaoGang Che () and
Yibai Yang ()
Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 3, 469-471
Patent protection may decrease R&D incentives due to the tournament effect. In this paper, we show that patent protection in the presence of a cooperative R&D option always increases the R&D incentive. In addition, this option dominates imitation to increase the R&D incentive under patent protection, and may also dominate royalty licensing depending on the R&D cost.
Keywords: Cooperative R&D; Patent protection; R&D incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O34 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Patent Protection with a Cooperative R&D Option (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:469-471
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