Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results

Claudia Landeo and Kathryn Spier ()
Additional contact information
Kathryn Spier: Harvard Law School, Postal: 1563 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138

No 2012-10, Working Papers from University of Alberta, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper reports further experimental results on exclusive dealing contracts. We extend Landeo and Spier’s [2009] work by studying Naked Exclusion in a strategic environment that involves a four-player, two-stage game. In addition to the roles of seller and buyers, our experimental environment includes the role of a potential entrant (a fourth passive player). Our findings are as follows. First, payoff endogeneity increases the likelihood of exclusion. Second, communication between the potential entrant and the buyers increases buyers’ coordination on their preferred equilibrium (equilibrium with entry) and hence, reduces the likelihood of exclusion. Entrant-buyers communication also induces more generous offers.

Keywords: exclusive dealing; market foreclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D62 D86 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2012-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Journal Article: Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:albaec:2012_010

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