EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results

Claudia Landeo () and Kathryn E. Spier

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2012, vol. 168, issue 1, 150-170

Abstract: This paper reports further experimental results on exclusive dealing contracts. We extend Landeo and Spier's (2009) work by studying Naked Exclusion in a strategic environment that involves a four-player, two-stage game. In addition to the roles of seller and buyers, our experimental environment includes the role of a potential entrant (a fourth passive player). Our findings are as follows. First, payoff endogeneity increases the likelihood of exclusion. Second, communication between the potential entrant and the buyers increases buyers' coordination on their preferred equilibrium (equilibrium with entry) and hence, reduces the likelihood of exclusion. Entrant-buyers communication also induces more generous offers.

JEL-codes: C72 C91 D62 D86 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/randomizing ... 45615x14189721363901 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
Working Paper: Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results (2012) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201203)168:1_150:edamff_2.0.tx_2-m

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().

 
Page updated 2019-07-22
Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201203)168:1_150:edamff_2.0.tx_2-m