Self-Enforcing Peace Agreements that Preserve the Status Quo

Michelle Garfinkel and Constantinos Syropoulos ()

No 2020-7, School of Economics Working Paper Series from LeBow College of Business, Drexel University

Abstract: On the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict (or war) that is possibly destructive. With a focus on outcomes that are immune to both unilateral deviations and coalitional deviations, we find that, depending on war's destructive effects, the degree of output security and the initial distribution of resources, peace can, but need not necessarily, emerge in equilibrium. We also find that, while ex ante resource transfers without commitment can improve the prospects for peace, war remains the unique equilibrium in pure strategies when the initial distribution of resources is sufficiently uneven.

Keywords: Disputes; output insecurity; destructive wars; peaceful settlement; unarmed peace (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D74 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2020-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo (2021)
Working Paper: Self-Enforcing Peace Agreements that Preserve the Status Quo (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:drxlwp:2020_007

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