Self-Enforcing Peace Agreements that Preserve the Status Quo

Michelle Garfinkel and Constantinos Syropoulos ()

No 8858, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: On the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict (or war) that is possibly destructive. With a focus on outcomes that are immune to both unilateral deviations and coalitional deviations, we find that, depending on war’s destructive effects, the degree of output security and the initial distribution of resources, peace can, but need not necessarily, emerge in equilibrium. We also find that, ex ante resource transfers without commitments can improve the prospects for peace, but only when the configuration of parameters describing the degree of output security and the degree of war’s destruction ensure the possibility of peace without such transfers at least for some sufficiently even initial resource distributions.

Keywords: disputes; output insecurity; destructive wars; peaceful settlement; unarmed peace (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D74 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo (2021)
Working Paper: Self-Enforcing Peace Agreements that Preserve the Status Quo (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8858

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