A Non-Cooperative Approach to the Folk Rule in Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems

Penélope Hernández (), Josep E. Peris and Juan Vidal-Puga
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Penélope Hernández: Departamento de Análisis Económico and ERI-CES, Postal: University of Valencia

No 19-5, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: This paper deals with the problem of finding a way to distribute the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree problem between the users. A rule that assigns a payoff to each agent provides this distribution. An optimistic point of view is considered to devise a cooperative game. Following this optimistic approach, a sequential game exerts this construction to define the action sets of the agents. The main result states the existence of a unique cost allocation in subgame perfect equilibria. This cost allocation matches the one suggested by the folk rule.

Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree; cost allocation; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2019-10-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2019_005

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