A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

Penélope Hernández, Josep E. Peris and Juan Vidal-Puga

European Journal of Operational Research, 2023, vol. 307, issue 2, 922-928

Abstract: This paper deals with the problem of finding a way to distribute the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree problem between the players. A rule that assigns a payoff to each player provides this distribution. An optimistic point of view is considered to devise a cooperative game. Following this optimistic approach, a sequential game provides this construction to define the action sets of the players. The main result states the existence of a unique cost allocation in subgame perfect equilibria. This cost allocation matches the one suggested by the folk rule.

Keywords: Game theory; Minimum cost spanning tree; Cost allocation; Subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: A Non-Cooperative Approach to the Folk Rule in Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:307:y:2023:i:2:p:922-928

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.09.015

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