Reject, Punish, or Withdraw? Cold and the Political Response of Highland Households in Peru

Judhajit Chakraborty, Leah Lakdawala and Eduardo Nakasone ()

No 118, Working Papers from Wake Forest University, Economics Department

Abstract: When a shock reveals that the state does not protect them, citizens may reject the political system, punish those in office, or withdraw. We ask which response prevails in the Peruvian highlands, using exposure to cold as the shock. We match twelve rounds of the national household survey to hourly temperatures at each household's location and identify the effects of cold from the variation in the timing of interviews within districts. Cold lowers farm revenue, kills livestock, and makes vulnerable household members more likely to fall ill and require medical attention. Households conclude that democracy delivers less: they become less likely to believe that democracy works well and that the rights it promises are respected, while support for democracy as a principle and confidence in specific institutions do not change. They withdraw rather than punish: absenteeism rises in presidential and municipal elections despite mandatory voting, but incumbent mayors are not punished; participation in community associations rises, and individual identity shifts from the state to indigenous groups. The erosion of support is concentrated where Peru's main cash transfer program reaches few of the poor, suggesting that social protection shields the relationship between citizens and democracy when extreme weather strikes.

Keywords: extreme temperature; climate change; democracy; voting; civic participation; indigenous identity; cash transfers; Peru (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 I38 O13 P16 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 65 pages
Date: 2024-10-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-pol and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:wfuewp:0118

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