Cognitive Dissonance and Choice

Larry Epstein and Igor Kopylov

No 525, RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)

Abstract: People like to feel good about past decisions. This paper models self- justification of past decisions. The model is axiomatic: axioms are defined on preference over ex ante actions (modeled formally by menus) The representation of preference admits the interpretation that the agent adjusts beliefs after taking an action so as to be more optimistic about its possible consequences. In particular, the ex post choice of beliefs is part of the representation of preference and not a primitive assumption. Behavioral characterizations are given to the comparisons "1 exhibits more dissonance than 2" and "1 is more self-justifying than 2."

Keywords: cognitive dissonance; optimism; temptation; self-control; self-justification; choice-theoretic; choosing beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-hpe and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_525.pdf full text (application/pdf)
None

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:roc:rocher:525

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Richard DiSalvo ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).