Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model

Tasos Kalandrakis

No WP66, Wallis Working Papers from University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy

Abstract: Pareto dominated agreements are shown to prevail with positive probability in an open set of status quo in a Markov perfect equilibrium of a one-dimensional dynamic bargaining game with endogeneous status-quo. This equilibrium is continuous, symmetric, with dynamic preerences that satisfy the single-plateau proerty. It is also shown that there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with single-peaked preferences.

Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model (2016)
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