Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model

Tasos Kalandrakis

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2016, vol. 28, issue 4, 525-536

Abstract: Pareto-dominated agreements are shown to prevail with positive probability in an open set of status quo in a Markov perfect equilibrium of a one-dimensional dynamic bargaining game. This equilibrium is continuous, symmetric, with dynamic preferences that satisfy the single-plateau property. It is also shown that there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with single-peaked preferences.

Keywords: Dynamic bargaining; endogenous status quo; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629815586881 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:28:y:2016:i:4:p:525-536

DOI: 10.1177/0951629815586881

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Theoretical Politics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().