Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model
Tasos Kalandrakis ()
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2016, vol. 28, issue 4, 525-536
Pareto-dominated agreements are shown to prevail with positive probability in an open set of status quo in a Markov perfect equilibrium of a one-dimensional dynamic bargaining game. This equilibrium is continuous, symmetric, with dynamic preferences that satisfy the single-plateau property. It is also shown that there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with single-peaked preferences.
Keywords: Dynamic bargaining; endogenous status quo; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:28:y:2016:i:4:p:525-536
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