Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device. An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector

Axel Gautier () and Anne Yvrande-Billon

CREPP Working Papers from Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège

Abstract: In the French urban public transport industry, services are often delegated to a private firm by the mean of a fixed-term regulatory contract. This contract specifies the duties of the firm and a financial compensation. When it expires, a new contract is awarded, possibly to a different operator. Cost-plus and fixed-price (gross cost or net cost) contracts are commonly used to regulate the operators in the transport industry. In this paper, we analyse the incentives for the operator to reduce its cost. These incentives come from both the profit maximization during the current contract and the perspective of contract renewal. In our model, the amount of cost-reducing effort depends on the contract type and the time remaining till contract expiration. We use a sample of 124 French urban public transport networks covering the period 1995-2002 to test our predictions. Our proxy for the cost reducing effort is technical efficiency. The data largely confirm the importance of contract type on performances and the incentive effect of contract renewal.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device. An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector (2013)
Working Paper: Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device: An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector (2013)
Working Paper: Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device: An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector (2013)
Working Paper: Contract renewal as an incentive device. An application to the French urban public transport sector (2008)
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