NMEs and The Double Remedy Problem

Thomas Prusa

No 2017/10, RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: In 2007 the US reversed its long-standing policy prohibiting the simultaneous imposition of anti-dumping duties (ADDs) and countervailing duties (CVDs) against non-market economies. The EU followed the US’ lead and also began imposing simultaneous ADDs and CVDs. The practice, however, leads to double remedies, which are when a domestic subsidy is offset by both an ADD and CVD. The WTO Appellate Body recently ruled that double remedies were inconsistent with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and that the burden was on the investigating authorities to ensure that double remedies were not being imposed.

Keywords: anti-dumping; non-market economies; china (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Journal Article: NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem (2017)
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