NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem

Thomas Prusa

World Trade Review, 2017, vol. 16, issue 4, 619-634

Abstract: In 2007, the US reversed its long-standing policy prohibiting the simultaneous imposition of anti-dumping duties (ADDs) and countervailing duties (CVDs) against non-market economies. The EU followed the US lead and also began imposing simultaneous ADDs and CVDs. The practice, however, leads to double remedies, which are when a domestic subsidy is offset by both an ADD and a CVD. The WTO Appellate Body recently ruled that double remedies were inconsistent with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and that the burden was on the investigating authorities to ensure that double remedies were not being imposed.

Date: 2017
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