The Role of Publicity Requirements on Entry and Auctions Outcomes
Decio Coviello () and
Mario Mariniello ()
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Decio Coviello: Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", http://www.ceistorvergata.it
No 180, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS
Using a regression discontinuity design, we document the effect of publicizing a procurement auction on entry and outcomes. We collect a large sample of procurement auctions, which by Italian law are assigned different publicity levels on the basis of their reserve price. We find that auctions publicized at the regional level have more bidders and higher winning rebates compared to auctions that are publicized on the notice board of the public administration managing the auction. Regionally-publicized auctions are also more likely to be won by bidders from outside the region, less likely to be won by small companies, and the same firm is more likely to win repeated auctions. Taken together, our results suggest that publicity informs more bidders and reduces search and preparation costs, which encourages entry and “improves” procurement.
Keywords: Publicity; Entry; Auctions; Regression Discontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D44 C31 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2010-12-21, Revised 2010-12-21
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