The Threat of Monitoring Job Search. A Discontinuity Design
Bart Cockx () and
Muriel Dejemeppe ()
Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium from Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Since July 2004 the job search effort of long-term unemployed benefit claimants is monitored in Belgium. We exploit the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at the age of 30 to evaluate the effect of a notification sent at least 8 months before job search is verified. The threat of monitoring increases transitions to employment, but of lower quality. In the less prosperous region, Wallonia, the impact is smaller, despite of the presence of specific counseling for the notified workers, and more heterogeneous. Moreover, in this region, the threat induces women to substitute sickness for unemployment benefits.
Keywords: evaluation; monitoring job-search; threat effect; regression-discontinuity; grouped data. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J64 J65 J68 H43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis and nep-lab
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: The Threat of Monitoring Job Search. A Discontinuity Design (2010)
Working Paper: The Threat of Monitoring Job Search: A Discontinuity Design (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rug:rugwps:10/685
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium from Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nathalie Verhaeghe ().