The Threat of Monitoring Job Search. A Discontinuity Design

Bart Cockx and Muriel Dejemeppe

No 3267, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Since July 2004 the job search effort of long-term unemployed benefit claimants is monitored in Belgium. We exploit the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at the age of 30 to evaluate the effect of a notification sent at least 8 months before job search is verified. The threat of monitoring increases transitions to employment, but of lower quality. In the less prosperous region, Wallonia, the impact is smaller, despite of the presence of specific counseling for the notified workers, and more heterogeneous. Moreover, in this region, the threat induces women to substitute sickness for unemployment benefits.

Keywords: evaluation; monitoring; job-search; threat effect; regression-discontinuity; grouped data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H43 J64 J65 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Threat of Monitoring Job Search. A Discontinuity Design (2010)
Working Paper: The Threat of Monitoring Job Search: A Discontinuity Design (2010)
Working Paper: The Threat of Monitoring Job Search. A Discontinuity Design (2010)
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