The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict

Sandeep Baliga () and Tomas Sjostrom

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Two decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by "extremists" who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions are strategic complements, a "hawkish extremist" can increase the likelihood of conflict by sending messages which trigger a "fear-spiral" of hawkish actions. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If actions are strategic substitutes, a "dovish extremist" (pacifist) can send messages which cause one decision-maker to back down and become more dovish. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. The hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision-makers if actions are strategic substitutes, and the pacifist is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements.

Keywords: global; strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2009-08-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:200906

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