On Essential, (Strictly) Perfect Equilibria

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: It is known that generic games within certain collections of infinite-action normal-form games have only essential equilibria. We point to a difficulty in showing that essential equilibria in generic games are (strictly) perfect, and we identify collections of games whose generic members have only essential and (strictly) perfect equilibria.

Keywords: infinite normal-form game; equilibrium refinement; essential equilibrium; perfect equilibrium; equilibrium existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2012-12-30
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Journal Article: On essential, (strictly) perfect equilibria (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201208

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