On essential, (strictly) perfect equilibria

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2014, vol. 54, issue C, 157-162

Abstract: It is known that generic games within certain collections of infinite-action normal-form games have only essential equilibria. We point to a difficulty in showing that essential equilibria in generic games are (strictly) perfect, and we identify collections of games whose generic members have only essential and (strictly) perfect equilibria.

Keywords: Infinite normal-form game; Essential equilibrium; Perfect equilibrium; Strictly perfect equilibrium; Equilibrium existence; Payoff security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On Essential, (Strictly) Perfect Equilibria (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:54:y:2014:i:c:p:157-162

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.010

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