On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We consider spaces of distributional and behavioral strategies, and highlight the relationship between their respective topologies, which implies that the two spaces are mutually interchangeable throughout the analysis. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.

Keywords: Bayesian games; discontinuous game; distributional strategy; behavioral strategy; payoff security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2014-05-18
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201402

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().