On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and
Richard McLean ()
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Richard McLean: Rutgers University
Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics
We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.
Keywords: discontinuous game; infinite game of incomplete information; behavioral strategy; distributional strategy; payoff security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Working Paper: On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201513
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