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On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean ()
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Richard McLean: Rutgers University

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.

Keywords: discontinuous game; infinite game of incomplete information; behavioral strategy; distributional strategy; payoff security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
Date: 2015-10-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games (2014)
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