Family Business: Causes and Consequences of Political Dynasties

Martín Rossi

No 114, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia

Abstract: I explore the causes of the existence of political dynasties in democratic societies. In particular, I investigate the causal relationship between tenure length and posterior dynastic success. Since tenure length is potentially endogenous in a model of political dynasties, I exploit a natural experiment in Argentina that provides a source of exogenous variation for tenure length. I find that having a longer tenure in Congress increases the probability of having a relative in future congresses. I also find that dynastic legislators have lower performance than non-dynastic legislators.

Keywords: political power; self-perpetuation; elites; legislators, legislative performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2012-04, Revised 2014-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc114.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:wpaper:114

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