Audits and Government Hiring Practices
Martín Rossi and
No 141, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia
We exploit the random assignment of Brazilian municipalities to an audit program to explore the link between audits and government hiring practices. We find that audited municipalities employ less labour to provide a given level of public services, and change the way in which they screen their employees—relying less on discretion and more on merit. Given that audits reduce corruption in the activities under scrutiny, our results suggest that different types of corruption can be complements rather than substitutes.
Keywords: bureaucracy; corruption; audits; efficiency; public sector employment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H11 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2020-06, Revised 2021-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-dev, nep-lam and nep-lma
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https://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc141.pdf First version, June 2020. This version, September 2021. (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Audits and Government Hiring Practices (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:wpaper:141
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