Politics, Institutions, and Fiscal Performance in the Argentine Provinces

Mariano Tommasi, Mark P. Jones and Pablo Sanguinetti
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Mark P. Jones: Department of Political Science, Michigan State University

No 16, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia

Abstract: We posit that the fiscal behavior of Argentine provinces is determined by a common pool game at two levels: within each province, and across political units. In the latter game, the national government has a greater incentive than the provincial governments to internalize the negative externality of fiscal imprudence. Given relatively strong party discipline, the president is able to induce governors from his party to internalize a portion of the externality to a greater extent than opposition governors. In Argentina “party matters” for fiscal behavior, but it does so for reasons different from those identified in studies of OECD countries.

Keywords: Argentina; common pool; federalism; fiscal behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 D72 H72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1997-06, Revised 2000-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Published “Politics, Institutions, and Fiscal Performance in a Federal System: An Analysis of the Argentine Provinces", Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 61 (2), abril 2000, pp. 305-333.

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