Taxes and Marriage: A Two-Sided Search Analysis

Hector Chade and Gustavo Ventura

No 36, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of differential tax treatment toward married and single individuals in the US on marriage formation and composition, divorce and labor supply. We develop a marriage market model with search frictions and heterogeneous agents that is sufficiently rich to capture key elements of the problem under consideration. We then calibrate the model and use it to evaluate the quantitative effects of a number of tax reforms aimed at making the tax law neutral with respect to marital status. We find that reforms can have substantial effects on the labor supply of married females and on the degree of assortative mating.

Keywords: Marriage Penalty; Marriage Tax; Two-Sided Search; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2001-08, Revised 2001-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc36.pdf First version, 2001 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Taxes and Marriage: A Two-Sided Search Analysis (2002)
Working Paper: Taxes and Marriage: A Two-Sided Search Analysis
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:wpaper:36

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Maria Amelia Gibbons ().