The Politicization of Public Sector Labor Relations: Argentine Teachers' Strikes in a Decenntralized Education System

Lucas Ronconi and Maria Victoria Murillo
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Maria Victoria Murillo: Yale University

No 47, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia

Abstract: This paper explores labor conflicts in the Argentine education sector and provides a model that explains the politicization of public sector labor relations in a context of high discretion in the application of rules. First, we argue that in those contexts, institutions do not generate stable expectations for actors’ interactions, in particular when the government is both the employer and the adjudicator in labor relations. Therefore, actors look for alternative mechanisms to inform their expectations about mutual interactions. These mechanisms vary depending on the context, and in Argentina, these are mainly based on long-term political alignments. Second, public sector employees are not exposed to international competition and typically enjoy job stability. Thus, economic hardship is more likely to define their incentives to strike, with unemployment having a positive effect on strikes by reducing exit options into the labor market. Finally, when public service providers (like teachers) go on strike, the costs of lost classes are internalized by the consumers of their services (i.e. families) rather than by their employers. Hence, teachers’ unions pay attention to public perceptions about the legitimacy of their demands because the consumers who suffer the cost of strikes can exercise pressure on their employers (e.g. potential electoral cost).

Keywords: politicization; public sector; labor; Argentina; teachers; strikes; education; decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2002-04, Revised 2002-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:wpaper:47

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